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1. The problem 
This paper addresses a particular problem in the constellation of issues we 
name "scope limits on quantifiers and variables". The problem concerns the 
limits on the inverse scope of a distributive universal DP over an indefinite. 
We assume here a semantic notion of scope according to which an expression 
a is in the scope of an expression b iff the interpretation of a is affected by 
the semantic contribution of b .  (For discussion, see Farkas ( 1 995).) For the 
cases we are interested in here the relation is defined in ( 1 ). 
( 1 )  A variable y contributed by an indefinite i s  within the scope o f  a 
distributive universal binding a variable x iff the interpretation of y 
co-varies with the interpretation of x. 
The relation between scope and syntactic hierarchy is of particular interest to 
both semanticists and syntacticians. The issue concerns the relation between 
surface c-command (defined in terms of branching nodes) and semantic scope. 
An expression a is said to have direct scope over an expression b iff b is in the 
scope of a and a c-commands b in Surface Structure. An expression a i s  said 
to have inverse scope over an expression b iff a has scope over b and b 
c-commands a in Surface Structure. 
Turning now to scope l imits, we take it as establ ished that the direct 
scope of universals is unl imited : 
(2) A universal may take scope over any indefinite i n  its c-commanding 
domain. 
Concerning inverse scope, it is  wel l  known that clause-internal i nverse scope 
of a universal over an indefin i te is possihle .  Thus, example (3a) is scopaJly 
amhiguous, the reading in  c. involving the indefinite co-varying with the 
universal .  
(3)  a .  
h .  
c .  
A memher of the Expose the Right group attended every public 
event held in  Iowa or New Hampsh ire .  (The New Republic, Feb. 
1 9, 1 996) 
a member of the group 
every puhlic event 
> every publ ic event 
> a memher of the group 
It is also wel l  known that the inverse scope of universals is not unlimited. 
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Thus, (4), unlike (3), has only the (absurd) reading in (4b) ;  the (sensible) 
reading in (4c) is lacking: 
(4) a. 
b. 
c. 
A politician said that every city should be the capital. 
A politician said that the President lives in every city. 
a politician > every city 
* every city > a politician 
Because of the contrast between (3) and (4), it is standardly assumed in the 
literature that (5) holds. (see Farkas ( 1 98 1 ), Fodor and Sag ( 1 982), Abush 
( 1994), BegheUi ( 1993),  Szabolcsi ( 1 995) . )  
(5) An element in a clause S cannot be within the scope of a universal 
quantifier in a clause S' if S c-commands S' . 
Universals contrast in this respect with indefinites, whose inverse scope is 
unbounded. Yet, there are counterexamples to (5), such as (6a), which has 
both the direct scope reading in (6b) and the inverse scope reading in (6c) : 
(6) a. 
b. 
A student made sure that every invited speaker had a ride. 
a student > every speaker c. every speaker > a student 
Under the c. reading, invited speakers are assigned students who take care of 
their needs. The universal in this case is said to have extra wide scope. l 
Extrawide scope then involves inter-clausal inverse scope of a universal over 
an indefini te . The extrawide scope reading (6c) is robust enough to warrant 
attention. 
In  this paper we wil l  i nvestigate, based on data from Greek, the 
condit ions that a l low a u niversal to take extrawide scope over an i ndefin i te .  
We wi l l  then propose an account based on an extension of the not ion of 
co-argument. The account is implemented in the indexical semantics 
framework of Farkas ( 1 995 ) .  We conclude with a review of open problems 
and a d iscuss ion of the impl ications of our fi ndings for the treatment of scope 
phenomena in general .  
2. Extrawide scope is not  always an i l lus ion 
We fi rst estab l i sh that extrawide scope is real . This is an issue s ince Fox and 
Sauerland ( 1 995 ) argue the contrary. They d iscuss examples involving 
apparent unexpected wide scope read ings of universals over i ndefin i tes in 
generic contexts such as (7) .  
(7) a.  In  general. a guide ensures that every tour to the Louvre i s  fun. 
b. In general, I give a tourist every leaflet. 
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Here we are interested in (7a), which has a reading under which the indefinite 
co-varies with the universal and therefore the universal appears to take 
extrawide scope. 
Fox and Sauerland argue that the apparent wide scope of the universal 
over the indefinite in (7a) is due to the fact that the indefinite is bound by the 
generic operator, combined with the assumption that the situations quantified 
over by the operator may involve single guide/tour (tourist/leaflet) pairs. 
They conclude that cases when universals appear to take unexpected wide 
scope over indefinites always involve the indefinite being bound by an implicit 
or explicit adverb of quantification, and therefore that the generalization in 
(5) can be maintained. 
While we accept Fox and Sauerland's analysis of (7a,b), we argue that 
matters cannot be laid to rest because cases of extrawide scope arise not only 
in generic but also in episodic contexts, and in such contexts the effect cannot 
be attributed to a matrix operator binding the indefinite. Thus, contrary to 
what Fox and Sauerland ( 1995) predict, the episodic version of their (7a), 
given in (8), is also judged as scopally ambiguous : 
(8) Yesterday, a guide made sure that every tour to the Louvre was fun. 
Note also that in the c. reading of (6a) above, the universal takes extrawide 
scope with respect to the indefinite (and as a result students co-vary with 
invited speakers) , and yet the sentence is not generic. In Greek, the extrawide 
scope read i ng of the counterpart of (6a), given in (9), i s  even more rohust. 
(9)  Kapjos fit it is frondise kathe proskekl imenos omi l i t i s  na ex i  metafora. 
some student took-care. PERF every invited speaker suhj has tramportatio/1 
'Some student made sure that every i nvited speaker got a r ide . '  
The perfective aspect of the matrix verh in  (9)  is a morphological s ignal  of the 
ep isodic  nature of this sentence. 
Note now that in  Greek, just l i ke in Engl ish ,  the un iversal cannot have 
inverse scope out of the complement of the verh leo 'say', amI there fore ( 10) ,  
jus t  l i ke (4) ,  is unamhiguous despite the pragmatic oddi ty of the narrow scope 
read ing of the universal .  
( 10) a .  
h.  
C. 
Kapjos pol i t ikos ipe oti kathe poli prepi na j in i  p rotevusa. 
some politician said that-indo every city should suhj he capital 
'Some pol i t i c ian said that every city should he the capita l . '  
some polit ic ian > every city 
* every city > some pol i t ician 
Based on the amhiguous status of (6a) ,  (8) and (9) we concl ude that a 
d istrihu tive un iversal may have extrawide scope over an indefinite in episodic 
sentences and therefore that extrawide scope is  not always an i l l u s ion .  Based 
on the contrast hetween ( 6 )  and ( 9 )  on the one hand, and ( 5 ) , ( I I )  on the 
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other, we conclude that the phenomenon of extrawide scope out of an 
embedded clause is restricted. The next task is to determine what the nature 
of this restriction is. In order to do that, we tum to a more detailed 
examination of the cases when extrawide scope is possible and of those when 
it is not. 
3. The role of the semantics of the matrix predicate 
We show below that one of the crucial factors involved is the semantic nature 
of the matrix predicate. In what follows we restrict our attention to Greek. 
Under A we list cases when extrawide scope is possible, and under B, cases 
when it is not. 
A. Cases when extra wide scope is possible 
Subjunctive complements of the verbs in ( 1 1 a) :  
( 1 1 ) a. frontizo 'take care' ,  'thelo' want, 'kanonizo' make sure 
b .  Kapjos kathijitis kanonise kathe fititis s' afti ti l ista na vri 
dhoulja 
some professor arranged every student in this the list subj find job 
'Some professor arranged every student on this l ist finds a job. '  
c. some prof. > every student; d. every student > some prof. 
Purpose clauses (subjunctive ) : 
( 12) a. rithmizo 'arrange', taktopio 'fix', d iasfal izo 'ensure' 
b .  Kapjos kathij i t i s  r i thmise etsi ta pragmata oste kathe taksi  na 
some professor arranged so the things that evel), class suhj 
c. 
ine proet imasmeni ja t is e ksetasis . 
he prepared for the exam 
'Some professor arranged th ings so that every cl ass be prepared 
for the exam.' 
some prof. > every class ; d. every class > some prof. 
B. Cases when extra wide scope is not possihle 
Subjunctive complements of the verbs in ( 1 3a) : 
( 1 3 )  a. efxome 'wish' ,  prot ino 'suggest' , parakalo 'ask for' 
b.  Kapjos pol i t i kos prot ine  kathe pol i  na j ini pro t evusa 
some politician suggested el'el}' city su/Jj /Jeco/l/(, capital 
'Some pol i t ician suggested every city to become the capi ta l . '  
c .  some pol . > every city ;  d . '  every c i ty > some po l .  
Ind icative complements of the verbs i n  ( 1 4 )  
( 1 4 )  a .  l eo  'say', isxi rizome 'claim' ,  oni revome 'dream' 
b. Kapjos fi t i t i s  on ireft ike oti  kathe kathij i t i s  t is  sxo l i s  apol i th ike 
some student dreamt that every professor the department got-fired 
'Some student d reamt that every professor i n  the department got 
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fired.' 
c. some student > every prof. ; d. • every prof. > some student 
Note that mood cannot be the distinguishing factor between the cases in A 
and the cases in B: although extrawide scope is possible only out of embedded 
subjunctive clauses, there are subjunctive clauses which block it, namely those 
in ( 13) .  
We argue below that the relevant difference involves details of  the 
lexical semantics of the matrix predicate. Specifically, it concerns the fact that 
for the cases under A, the matrix predicate assigns to its Su argument the role 
of initiator of the eventuality denoted by the clause that contains the critical 
universal, while for the cases under B this is not so. The initiator role is 
defined in ( 15) (see Farkas 1988» : 
( 15) An individual i is the initiator of an eventuality e iff i brings e abou t  (in 
some world or worlds) .  In this case i is said to be in the RESP relation 
with e. 
The semantic role of the initiator and the RESP relation were shown to play 
a role in the semantics of obligatory control and obviation (cf. Farkas ( 1 988) 
and Farkas ( 1992» . We show below that these notions are relevant to 
characterizing extrawide scope as well. 
First, some brief comments are in order as regards the relation 
between initiators and Agents. If i is the initiator of e and also a participant 
in e, then i is one of the arguments of the predicate that names e, namely the 
Agent. The i nitiator of an event e, however, need not be a participant in e, 
and consequently, it need not figure in the argument structure of the predicate 
naming e. In such cases i is the external Agent of e, defined as in ( 1 6) .  
( 1 6 ) If i is the initiator of e but it is not a participant i n  e, i is the external 
Agent of e. 
To exemplify, consider the sentences helow « 1 7b) is from Farkas ( 1 988)) :  
( 1 7) a. John put the sa le s ign in the shopwindow in  order to attract customers. 
h. The store had a sale sign in  the shopwindow in  order to attract 
customers .  
I n  ( 1 7a), John, the subject of the matrix clause, is the init iator of the 
eventual ity denoted by its clause, as wel l  as i ts Agent; he is also the control ler 
of the understood subject of the purpose clause. In  ( 1 7b) on the other hand, 
the understood subject of the purpose clause is interpreted as having brought 
ahout the eventual i ty denoted by the matrix hut i n  this case without being a 
d i rect participant in this eventual ity. The understood Su of the purpose clause 
in  ( 1 7b) is the external Agent of the eventual ity denoted hy the matrix. 
Going now hack to our cases under A and B, note that in the A-cases, 
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when extrawide scope is possible, the matrix indefinite is the external Agent 
of the eventuality denoted by the clause containing the critical universal. In 
the examples under B, on the other hand, this is not the case. Thus, when you 
arrange, fix or make sure that an eventuality obtains, you have to perform an 
action meant to bring that eventuality about. When you wish, or suggest that 
something happen or when you say or dream that something happens, no such 
action is entailed. In the cases under A, the referent of the matrix indefinite 
is entailed to have taken action (or contemplate taking action) in order to 
bring about the embedded eventuality, while in the cases under B no such 
entailment is present. The descriptive generalization that characterizes the 
extrawide scope cases we looked at so far is stated in ( 1 8) :  
( 1 8) First generalization 
A distributive universal DPj may have extrawide scope over an 
indefinite DPj when the referent of DPj is the external Agent of the 
eventuality denoted by the clause contaming DPj• 
This generalization correctly predicts the contrast in ( 19) and (20), given that 
in ( 1 9a) the matrix Su can be understood as the initiator of the eventuality 
denoted by the complement, while in (20a) it cannot: 
( 19) a. 
b. 
(20) a. 
Kapjos mixanikos kanonise kathe ethusa s' afto to ktirio na exi 
some engineer arranged every room in this the building subj has 
kali akustiki 
good acoustics 
'Some engineer arranged that every room in  this bui ld ing have 
good acoustics. ' 
some engineer > every room; every room > some engineer 
Kapjos kathijit is i thele kathe ethusa s' afto to ktir io na exi 
some professor wanted every room in this the building subj has 
kali akustiki 
good acoustics 
'Some professor wanted every room in this bu i ld ing to have 
good acoustics . '  
b .  some professor > every room;  * every room > some professor 
In  ( 1 9a) ,  the referent of the i ndefin ite is natural ly understood as bringing 
ahout the eventual i ty i n  the complement, hence it is the external Agent of 
that eventual i ty. In  (20a) ,  on the other hand, given standard assumptions 
ahout professors not having much direct influence on acoustics of classrooms, 
the indefin i te is not interpreted as heing the external Agent of the eventual i ty 
denoted hy the complement. The poss ih i l i ty of extrawide scope paral le l s  this 
difference. 
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4. Extended co-arguments 
Let us restate the problem as it appears now. First, clause internal inverse 
scope of a distributive universal over an indefinite is possible (cf. (3» . Second, 
inter- clausal inverse scope, i .e. , extrawide scope, is allowed when the matrix 
indefinite is the external Agent of the embedded eventuality. The following 
two questions arise at this point: (i) why is the restriction against inter-clausal 
inverse scope relaxed under this particular condition?, and (ii) more generally, 
is the restriction against inverse scope of universals sensitive to the syntactic 
relation of clause-mateness or to the semantic relation of co-argumenthood?2 
We start answering these questions by looking at the initiator role and 
the RESP relation in further detail . As discussed in work on control and 
obviation, when i is the external Agent of an eventuality e, i may bring e about 
by acting directly on a participant in e. We call this participant the affected 
argument. The affected argument is canonically realized as the subject of the 
embedded clause.3 Two points are crucial for us. First, that the external 
Agent of e acts on the affected argument when bringing e about, and second, 
that the affected argument is canonically realized as the subject of the 
embedded clause denoting e. 
Going back to extrawide scope now, note that the cases allowing it are 
characterized by the following two properties: (i) as stated in ( 1 8), the 
indefinite is the external Agent of the eventuality denoted by the embedded 
clause;  (ii) the universal is the affected argument. The new generalization is 
given in (2 1 ) :  
(2 1 )  Second generalization 
A d istributive u niversal DPj that realizes a participant i n  an eventuality 
e may have extrawide scope over an indefinite DPj when the referent 
of DP1 is the external Agent of e, and the argument realized by DPj is 
the atlected argument .  
The crucial observation here is that when a professor arranges that a student 
gets a job. the student is affected by the actions of the professor, and if 
several students are involved the professor may need to take several specific 
act ions, one per student .  
Our c la im is  that the extrawide scope effect is due to the fact that, 
given the semantics of the sentence, the referent of the indefin i te may be 
understood as act i ng upon the argument denoted by the universal . More 
generally put,  extrawide scope is possible because there is a direct semantic 
relation between the two arguments involved in  virtue of which they act as if 
they were co-arguments. The crucial semantic characteristic of co-arguments 
is that they are both relata in  the relation named by the predicate. In the case 
of an external Agent and the affected argument, they share with co-arguments 
the property of be i ng relata in a semantic relation but i n  this case the 
existence of the relation is mediated by the semantics of the predicates the 
two expressions are arguments of. The external Agent  and the affected 
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argument are extended co-arguments in the sense defined in (22) : 
(22) Extended Co-arguments 
In a configuration like (i), 
(i) (P(x, [Q(y, . . .  ] , . . .  ) 
x and y are extended co-arguments iff, given the semantics of P and Q, 
there is an eventuality e ' in which the referents of x and y are 
co-participants. In this case there must be a direct relation R that 
obtains between x and y. 
Clause-bounded inverse scope is possible because the two expressions involved 
in the scope relation are co-arguments. Extrawide inverse scope is possible 
when the two expressions involved are extended co-arguments. In the cases 
we looked at so far, these involved external Agents and affected arguments. 
The common feature of clause-bounded and extrawide scope is that the 
two scopally related expressions are co-participants in some eventuality, hence 
also relata in a semantic relation R. In the face of this, we arrive at the final 
generalization in (23) :  
(23) Final generalization 
Extrawide scope of a distributive universal over an indefinite is 
possible iff the two arguments are co-participants in some eventuality 
e i n  virtue of the lexical semantics of the predicates involved. In this 
case the two arguments are relata in some relation R. 
The moral to be drawn from the above d iscussion is that what makes inverse 
scope possible is not syntact ic c lause-mateness but semantic co-argumenthood. 
5. Further predictions 
5. 1. Non-suhject universals cannot have extrawide scope 
Given (23 )  and the fact that affected arguments are canonical ly realized as 
emhedded suhjects. we predict that non-subject universals cannot have 
extrawide scope even if the matrix predicate is  of the right type.  The data in  
(24) show that  th is prediction is borne out .  These sentences cannot be 
interpreted with the indefin i te with i n  the scope of the universal : 
(24 )  a. Kapjos kathij i t i s  kanonise 0 proedros na parako\uthis i  kathe 
ekdi losi 
some professor arranged the president suhj attends every event 
'Some professor arranged that the president attend every event.' 
h .  Kapjos kathij i t i s  frondise i gramateas na dosi tis et is is  se kathe 
fi t i t i  
some professor took-care the secretary subj gives the applications 
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to every student 
'Some professor made sure that the secretary gives the 
applications to every student.' 
c. some prof. > every event * every event > some prof. 
d. some professor > every appl. * every appl. > some professor 
So far then we accounted for the possibility of inverse scope in the case of 
arguments, and for the possibility of extrawide scope when the indefinite is an 
external Agent and the distributive universal is an affected argument. The two 
cases share the property that the indefinite is an argument of a relation R that 
is distributed over the domain of the universal. 
5.2. Perception verbs 
The core claim behind (23) is that inverse scope is possible only in case the 
two expressions involved are semantic co-arguments. The semantic co­
argumenthood condition is trivially satisfied in mono-clausal cases, when the 
two expressions are syntactic co-arguments as well. The condition on 
co-argumenthood is less trivially satisfied inter-claus ally just in case the 
indefinite and the distributive universal are extended co-arguments. In that 
case, syntactic and semantic co-argumenthood diverge. We saw one such case 
in some detail, involving external Agents and affected arguments. Our 
account does not rest on these particular roles, and therefore we expect other 
cases of mismatch between semantic and syntactic co-argumenthood to behave 
in a s imilar manner. 
We examine briefly another class of cases, namely perception verbs. In  
Greek, just l i ke i n  English, such verbs license ECM constructions, where the 
embedded subject is marked Accusative : 
(25 )  a. Kapja nosokoma idhe kathe astheni na perni to farmako tu 
some nurse saw every patient. ace subj take the medicine his 
'Some nurse saw every patient take his medication. '  
b .  some nurse > every pat ient ;  c. every patient > some nurse 
In such sentences. in both English and Greek, a distributive universal 
embedded subject may have extrawide scope over an indefinite matrix subject, 
hence (25a) has the read i ngs in (25b.c) .  Our account predicts this ambigu i ty 
on semant ic grounds s i nce. as has long been noted about perception verbs, the 
re lat ion denoted by the matrix pred icate must hold between the matrix subject 
and the accusative subject .  Because of this requi rement, the two subjects will 
be extended co- arguments in our sense. and (23 )  predicts the possibility of 
inverse scope. We also pred ict that non-subject universals i n  the embedded 
clause cannot have extrawide scope . The non-ambiguous status of (26a) shows 
that th is pred ict ion is correct. 
(26) a. Kapjos kath ij i t i s  akuse ton Pavlo na perni sinendefksi kathe fititi 
43 
44 
b. 
DONKA F. FARKAS AND ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOU 
some professor heard the Paul. ace subj take interview every student 
'Some professor heard Paul interview every student.' 
some > every c. * every > some 
Greek does not license ECM with consider-type verbs. Yet, just like in 
English, consider may be construed with a small clause in which case 
extrawide scope is possible, given that in that configuration, subject and direct 
object are syntactic and semantic co-arguments: 
(27) a. 
b. 
Kapjos kathijitis theori kat he fititi idhiofiia 
some professor considers every student genius 
'Some professor considers every student a genius.' 
some > every c. every > some 
Hornstein ( 1 995) makes the observation that in English small clause-consider 
contrasts with ECM-consider in that the former but not the latter allows the 
accusative universal to scope over the matrix subject. This is to be expected 
in view of the fact that the semantics of ECM-consider is close to the 
semantics of think and therefore the two subjects are not extended co­
arguments. 
6. Implementation in an indexical theory of scope 
The facts presented above are not naturally amenable to a purely syntactic 
account of scope. In  its prist ine form, such an account rests on  the following 
two assumptions: ( i )  DPs c-command their scope at LF. Consequently, if an 
i ndefi nite is i nterpreted as co-varying with a universal, the latter must 
c-command the former at LF. ( i i )  DPs reach their LF posit ions via OR, a 
�yntactic movement ru le which adjoins DPs to a higher clausal node. Under 
these assumptions. the instance of OR responsible for rais ing quantificational 
DPs will have to he clause-hounded s i nce normally the scope of such DPs is 
clause -hounded. Clauses would therefore have to act as harriers to this 
movement .  When the DP is a distr ihutive universal, however, OR would have 
to he allowed to cross one clause houndary in case the condit ions in (23) are 
met. namely when the un iversal DP and one of the arguments in the matrix 
are extended co -arguments.4 In just these cases then, the clause houndary 
should not count as a harrier. G iven that there is no independently justified 
syntactic  characte rizat ion of the clauses in  question, the syntact ic nature of the 
phenomenon is in serious douht .  Recall that an appeal to mood wi l l  not do,  
s ince there are suhjunctive clauses that act  as barriers for extrawide scope, 
whi le others do not. An appeal to time dependency relations hetween matrix 
and complement would not help e i ther, s i nce the complement of protino 
'suggest' does not al low extrawide scope of its universal suhject, whi le that of 
kanonizo 'make sure'  does, and yet, hoth complements have future t ime 
reference with respect to the matrix .  Note also that subjunctive clauses 
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allowing extrawide scope do not differ from those that do not with respect to 
the status of their subjects either. Finally, simply claiming that the clause 
boundary of certain complements ceases to act as a barrier to QR would fail 
to predict the restriction to subjects discussed in 5 . 1 .  We conclude that a 
purely structural account is not feasible. 
Beghelli and Stowell ( 1995) propose a semantically sophisticated 
version of QR, which raises a DP to a particular LF position that is 
compatible with the semantic feature of the DP in question. Though sensitivity 
to semantic factors is built into this system, the data discussed here are still 
problematic: whether a universal distributive DP moves to the head of the 
appropriate semantic projection within its own clause or whether it may go 
one clause up would have to depend on semantic and lexical details that do 
not normally interfere with the operation of syntactic rules. 
We tum now to an account of these facts within the indexical approach 
to scope proposed in Farkas ( 1995) ,  where both assumptions (i) and (ii) above 
are given up. Under this approach, syntactic configuration does not determine 
scope relations univocally. The crucial relevant aspects of the theory are listed 
below under (a)-(f) .  
(a) Semantic interpretation operates on semantic structures. I t  is at this 
level that scopal relations are determined. 
(b) Indefinite DPs contribute to the semantic structure a variable and 
a restrictive expression contributed by the Descriptive Content of the DP.5 
Following Heim ( 1 982) and Kamp ( 1 98 1 ) , we assume that the existential force 
of indefinites is a consequence of the definition of truth of expressions that 
may contain free variables: 
(28) Let a be an expression that may contain free variables. a is true iff 
there is an assignment function f that satisfies the conditions of a. 
(c) Quantification at the semantic structure level involves a Restrictor, a 
Quantifier and a NS, as i n  (29 ) :  
( 29 )  Restrictor Q NS 
The Restrictor identifies a set of cases ;  the whole expression is true iff 
Q-many of these cases are such that the NS is true of them. The cases 
identified by the Restrictor constitute the logical subject, whi le the expression 
in  the NS i s  the logical predicate. The predicat ion relation between the 
Restrictor and the NS may be distr ibutive or collective. 
(d) A DP whose Determiner i s  a d istribu tive universal ( that is, every or 
each in  Engl ish ,  kathe and 0 kathena� in Greek respectively) contributes a 
variable x and a restrictive expression eR contributed by the Descriptive 
Content (DC) of the noun phrase .  The semantic contribution of such a DP 
must form the Restrictor of a universal quantificational structure whose NS 
is predicated distributively over the set of cases introduced by the Restrictor. 
Because of the d istributivity requirement of every and each we will call them 
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strong distributives.6 The semantic structure of an expression containing a 
strong distributive is as in (30), where eR is the contribution of the DC of the 
universal DP, and eNS is the expression in the Nuclear Scope. 
(30) Restrictor: 
xi:eR 
Nuclear Scope: 
eNS 
The role of the Restrictor here is to introduce a set of assignment functions 
F', one for each element of the witness set denoted by the universal DP. 
Because of the distributive nature of the predication, each such function must 
be extendable so as to satisfy the NS. Truth conditions of expressions of the 
form in (30) are given in (3 1 ) :  
(3 1 )  a of  the form in  (30) i s  true iff there i s  an assignment function / with 
the following property: for every !' that extends / with respect to x such 
that !' satisfies eR' there is an assignment function f' that extends !' 
such that f' satisfies eNS' 
The notion of extension is defined in (32) : 
(32) An assignment function!, extends an assignment function/with respect 
to a (possibly empty) set of variables X iff !, agrees with / on all 
assignments except for the variables in X. 
The notation !,(J/x) will be used for 'f' extends / with respect to x'. 
(e) A strong distributive DP introduces the set of evaluation functions 
F' that evaluate the Restrictor, as wel l  as the set of functions F" that extend 
the elements of F', and that evaluate the NS. 
( f) A variable y i ntroduced by an i ndefi ni te is within the scope of a 
distributive un iversal i ntroducing a variable x iff the values of y co-vary with 
those of x. This means that y is evaluated by the functions in F", which extend 
those in  F'  at least with respect to y. In  this case y is  dependent on x. 
Dependent variables can be seen as Skolem functions whose range is given by 
the values of the variable they depend on. 
Under these assumptions. the scope of y with respect to x is  a matter 
of whether the value of y i s  fixed i ndependently of x, by /, or  whether y is 
dependent on x, in which case y i s  evaluated by the functions in F". This 
means that the funct ions in F" extend those in  F' with respect to y. The 
former option resu lts in  the wide scope reading of the indefi nite with respect 
to the un iversal, and the latter i n  the narrow scope reading. Accessib i l i ty 
cond it ions define which assignment functions may evaluate a particu lar 
indefin i te. Scope ambigu it ies are the resu l t  of several functions being 
accessible to a given i ndefin i te .  Ordinary indefin i tes may always have wide 
scope with respect to a universal because the in i tial function / i s  always 
accessible to them. 
Since structural condit ions do not necessarily determine a unique 
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to essentially semantic notions. Second, the scope limits of universals are 
genuinely different from that of indefinites, whose scope is unbounded. An 
adequate theory of scope has to account for this difference. Third, the contrast 
between the scope limits on distributive universals and non-distributive 
quantifiers on the one hand, and that between indefinites and quantificational 
DPs on the other supports the claim, made most recently in Szabolcsi ( 1 995), 
that different DPs scope differently, depending on their semantic 
characteristics (see also Liu ( 1 99 1 ), Ben-Shalom ( 1 993) . )  Finally, the 
sensitivity of inverse scope to semantic factors of the type discussed above 
casts serious doubt on the possibility of a purely configurational treatment of 
scope. 
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1 .  For a brief discussion of extrawide scope, see Farkas ( 1 995) ,  from where 
(6) i s  taken. 
2. This question, left open in Farkas ( 1 98 1 ), echoes one raised by Bach and 
Partee ( 1 980) concerning anaphora, and dealt with in Reinhart and Reuland 
( 1 993 ) .  
3 .  Accounting for the connection between affected arguments and subjects 
involves the interact ion of Proto-Agent properties (as discussed in Dowty 
( 1 99 1 »  and discourse prominence considerations, which we do not understand 
clearly enough at present  and therefore leave outside the scope of this paper. 
The connection was i nvoked in Farkas ( 1 992) to account for the subject 
orientation of obviation i n  Romance. 
4.  Problems raised for OR by the unbounded nature of the scope of 
indefin i tes, and the clause-bounded nature of the scope of d istribu tives are 
d iscussed in detai l  in Farkas ( 1 995 ) .  
5 .  We are assuming a l ogical syntax that  uses  restricted variables .  For a 
d iscussion of the advantages of such a system for natural l anguage semantics, 
see McCawley ( 1 980). Below, expressions whose role i s  to restrict the possible 
values of a variable wi l l  be prefixed by : .  
6 .  The strong d istributivity o f  these determiners i s  responsible for their 
inabi l i ty to occur as subjects of col lective predicates :  
( i )  * Every/each student gathered i n  the assembly room. 
Each i s  more distributive than every in  the sense that i t  requires a co-variant, 
i .e. , an event or i ndividual variable distributed over its domain .  (see Vendler 
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7. Conclusions and open problems 
We start by reviewing some of the problems left open. The most salient one 
is the fact that only strong distributives may have extrawide scope. The scope 
of other quantifiers is strictly clause bounded: if one replaces every (Greek 
kathe) by all or many (Greek ali or poli respectively) in the examples that 
allow extrawide scope readings these readings disappear. We suggest that the 
ability of strong distributives to take extrawide scope should be connected to 
the ease with which they take clause-internal inverse scope. A comprehensive 
theory of scope has to account for the fact that inverse scope is a marked 
option in general, and that strong distributives avail themselves of it with 
more ease than other DPs.9 An account along the lines of Section 6 would 
limit inverse scope to cases where the functions introduced by the distributive 
are particularly salient, and would have to connect salience to strong 
distributivity. 
The next problem involves intervention effects. It has been noted in the 
literature (most recently in Farkas and E. Kiss ( 1996», that certain adverbs 
block inverse scope. As shown by the contrast between (37) and (38), an 
adverb like para poli 'very much' has the same effect in extrawide scope cases: 
(37) a. Kapjos kathijitis ithele kathe ipopsifios na episkefti to panepistimio 
some professor wanted every candidate subj visit the campus 
'Some professor wanted every candidate to visit the campus. '  
b. some > every c. every > some 
(38) a. Kapjos kathijitis ithele para poli  kathe ipopsifios na episkeft i  to 
some professor wanted very much every candidate subj visit the 
panepistimio 
campus 
'Some professor wanted very much every candidate to vis it  the 
campus. '  
b. some > every c. * every > some 
At present we can only connect this problem to other u nsolved mysteries. 
Thus, Giannakidou & Quer ( 1 995) and Giannakidou (in progress) note that 
the same adverbs block Neg Raising and the long distance l i censing of NPls, 
while Farkas and E. Kiss ( 1 996) note that they block the comparative read ing 
of superlatives. Additional ly, these adverbs appear to also block mono-clausal 
i nverse scope: (39) has no reading in  which reporters co-vary with candidates. 
(39 ) Some reporter i nfuriated very much every candidate who gave a speech 
at this rally. 
An account of these facts wi l l  have to be left for further research . 
The conclusions we draw from the above d iscussion are the fol lowing. 
First, inverse scope of distributive universals is l imited to (extended) co­
arguments, rather than to clause-mates. Scope l imits are thus seen as sensitive 
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accessible function, variables in semantic structure are indexed with the 
function that fixes their value. The functional index borne by a variable must 
be accessible to the variable in question. The scope ambiguity of a sentence 
such as Every nurse examined a patient is due to the fact that the indefinite 
may be evaluated either by f or by the functions r E F", the former being 
always accessible, the latter being accessible because the indefinite is in the 
NS of a quantificational structure whose Restrictor is contributed by a 
distributive universal. The variable contributed by the indefinite is indexed by 
f in the former case, and by r in the latter. If x is indexed by r, and r extends 
some functions f, r extends f with respect to x. 
Now the question of limits on the scope of the universal reduces to 
the question of when the functions F" become available for the interpretation 
of an indefinite. The accessibility conditions are given in (33) :  
(33) a. 
b. 
The functions F" introduced by a distributive universal binding 
a variable x are accessible to any variable y introduced by an 
indefinite in the c-commanding domain of the universal. 
The functions F" introduced by a distributive universal bind ing 
a variable x are accessible to a variable y if x and y are 
co-arguments in some relation R. 
Condition (33a) accounts for the poss ib i l i ty of direct scope in sentences l i ke 
(34a,b) ;  (33b) accounts for the possibi l i ty of clause in ternal inverse scope in  
cases l i ke (34c). 
(34) a. 
b. 
c. 
Every nurser examined a pat ientU',) . 
Every nurser tho.
ught that Dr . �ones cured a pat ient(f') ' 
A nurse(f') exammed every pat lentr . 
(The suhscript (j") on an indefi nite indicates the poss ih i l i ty of the 
variable introduced by i t  to he indexed by r, and f' on the un iversal ind icates 
that the variahle introduced hy it must he evaluated by the fu nct ions in F) 
The wide scope reading of  t he  indefin i te with respect to t he  un ive rsal is give n 
by the choice of f as the index of the indefin i te, a choice that is assu med to 
always be avai lable for ordinary indefin ites . A universal cannot take an 
indefi nite with in i ts scope when the indefi n ite is not a co-argu ment of the 
un iversal, or is not in i ts c-commanding domain because, in that case .  nei ther 
(33a) nor (33b) are met. The indexing of the indefin i te by r in  (3:'i) is thus 
ru led out :  
(35 ) * A nurser said that every patien tr is cured. 
Under these assumptions. extrawide inverse scope is a natural extension of 
co-argument inverse scope. Condit ion (33b) above al lows an indefin i te to be 
dependent on a universal when the two are relata in some relation R. This 
condit ion is fulfi l led i n  mono-clausal cases, where the predicate of the clause 
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names the relation in question, and therefore the universal and the indefinite 
are co-arguments. Crucially now, the condition in (33b) is also fulfilled in the 
case of extended co-arguments, where the existence of the relation R relating 
the universal and the indefinite is entailed by the predicates the two 
expressions are arguments of. It is because of this entailment that the variable 
introduced by the indefinite is an argument of a relation that is distributed 
over the domain of the universal, which renders the d istributive functions F" 
introduced by the universal accessible to the indefinite? The indexing that 
gives the extrawide scope reading of the universal in (6) is indicated 
informally in (36a), and more formally in (36b), where I' are the functions 
introduced by the universal, and [' are the functions that extend 1'. The truth 
conditions of (36b) are given in (36c). 
(36) a. 
b. 
c. 
A student!" made sure that every speakerr had a ride. 
make sure (yf': student(y), [R Xl speaker(x)] [NS has ride(x)] )  
The expressIOn in (36b) is  true iff there is an  f with the 
following property: every ['(fix) such that ['(x) E I Ispeaker l l has 
the property that there is an ['(f'/y) such that ['(y) E I Istudent II 
such that ['(y) made sure that ['(x) has a ride. 
The effect of indexing y with [', wh ich are functions that extend  the functions 
f' introduced by the u niversal, is to have the values of y fixed re lative to the 
values of x, hence to have x evaluated prior to y. This gives the effect of 
having the Restrictor in  (36b) ' raise over' y, or, converse ly, of having y 
' lowered i nto' the NS in the sense that the semantic contribution of the 
Restrictor is made avai lable at the level of the embedd ing predicate.s The 
functions contributed by x are accessible to y i n  the absence of c-command 
only if there is a re lat ion R that x and y are arguments of. I t  is in virtue of 
this relation that the semantic contribution of the universal is access ible to the 
indefinite, and therefore the un iversal is interpreted prior to the indefin i te . 
Priority then is determined not only in view of structural configuration but 
also in  view of (entai led ) co-argumenthood. 
To sum up, under th is  approach, an indefin ite is within the scope of a 
universal iff the variable introduced by the latter is dependent on the variable 
introduced by the former. Th is dependency is represented at semantic 
structure by a functional index requ iring the dependent variable to be 
evaluated by functions that extend those introduced by the un ive rsa l .  The 
question of scope l imits on the universal becomes a quest ion of  access ibi l ity 
of dependent functional indices. The access ib i l i ty re lation is se nsit ive to 
co-argumenthood/extended co-argumenthood, the latter involving en tai lments 
of the predicates taking the relevant variables as arguments :  the functions 
introduced by a strong distr ibutive are access ible to co-argu ments and 
extended co-arguments of the distr ibut ive . 
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( 1 967) and Beghelli and Stowell ( 1 995»:  
(ii) Each student ran / sang a song. 
(iii) *Each student is intelligent. 
7. Invoking entailments coming from the lexical semantics of the relevant 
predicates is not unique to the cases discussed here. It is an influential thesis 
that, in some cases, such entailments have to be invoked in order to derive 
grammaticality for negative polarity items (NPIs) in examples such as I am 
surprised he has any friends, where the well-formedness of the sentence with 
any is accounted for in terms of an entailment be surprised gives rise to, 
namely that I expected that he didn 't have any friends (cf. Baker ( 1970), 
Linebarger ( 1 980), and Giannakidou (in progress» for arguments and 
discussion). 
8 .  If one wanted a strict correspondence between scope possibilities and 
hierarchy at semantic structure one would need to posit a Restrictor Raising 
rule sensitive to (extended) co-argumenthood which would convert (33b) into 
(i) :  
(i) [R Y speaker(x)] [NS make sure (Yf': student(y), (has ride (x»] 
The analysis is ,  of course, compatible with a system in which OR raises 
universals in a clause-bounded fashion. For an argument in favor of this 
position, see Kennedy (to appear) and references therein. If one wants the 
correspondence between scope and universals to hold at LF, OR would have 
to be made sensitive to the semantic factors discussed here. 
9. For an account of the markedness of inverse scope readings based on OR 
and economy principles, see Reinhart ( 1 995 ) . Under the view developed here 
indexing that parallels c-command would count as less marked than one which 
doesn't. 
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